Adverse Selection in Credit Markets: Evidence from a Policy Experiment by Ashok Rai & Stefan Klonner
Adverse Selection in Credit Markets:
Evidence from a Policy Experiment
August 2007
Stefan Klonner, Cornell University
Ashok S. Rai, Williams College
Abstract: We test if riskier borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates than safer
borrowers are as predicted by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). The data are from an Indian
￿nancial institution where interest rates are determined by competitive bidding. The
government imposed an interest rate ceiling in 1993 and then relaxed the ceiling in 2002:
Changes in default patterns are analyzed before and after each of these policy changes. We
￿nd evidence of adverse selection despite the use of collateral as a screening device. This
study isolates adverse selection from moral hazard and controls for information on riskiness
observed by the lender but not by the researcher.
JEL Codes: D82, G21, O16
Keywords: Defaults, Risk, Auctions, Asymmetric Information.
0We thank Garance Gennicot, Bill Gentry, Magnus Hattlebak, Seema Jayachan, Dean Karlan, Ted
Miguel, Rohini Pande, Antoinette Schoar and Jonathan Zinman for useful suggestions. We also thank
seminar/conference participants at Berkeley, Boston University, Cornell, EUI Florence Credit Contracts
Conference, Groningen Micro￿nance Conference, Harvard-MIT, Indian School of Business, Montreal CIR-
PEE Conference, NEUDC, Paris-Jourdan, Toulouse, Wharton Indian Financial System conference, and
Williams for comments. We are grateful to the South Indian Chit Fund company for sharing their data and
their time. All errors are our own. Klonner: Dept. of Economics, Cornell University, 444 Uris Hall, Ithaca,
NY 14853 stefan@klonner.de; Rai: Dept. of Economics, Fernald House, Williams College, Williamstown,
MA 01267 arai@williams.edu
11 Introduction
Many economists believe that asymmetric information impedes the e¢ cient functioning of
markets. Even though there is substantial theoretical research assuming asymmetric infor-
mation, the empirical evidence is rather mixed and largely con￿ned to insurance markets
(Chiappori and Salanie 2003). In this paper we look for evidence of adverse selection in
credit markets. We test if riskier borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates than
safer borrowers are. This well-known prediction of Stiglitz and Weiss￿(1981) adverse se-
lection model has had considerable in￿ uence in ￿nance, development and macroeconomics
but has received little empirical scrutiny.
There are three main empirical challenges for such a study. First, the lender may
have "soft" information on borrower riskiness which by de￿nition is di¢ cult to transmit or
codify (Berger and Udell, 1995;Petersen and Rajan 1994; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). A
researcher who is uninformed about the lender￿ s soft information may erroneously conclude
that there is adverse selection on unobserved riskiness. Secondly, lenders often require
collateral. Even if adverse selection is an underlying friction in credit markets, the lender
may be able to mitigate adverse selection through collateral requirements (Bester 1985) or
using cosigners as collateral (Besanko and Thakor 1987). Finally, researchers only have
information on defaults. It is entirely possible that higher interest rates increase default
rates for moral hazard reasons instead of adverse selection. It is di¢ cult empirically to
distinguish between the two.
The contribution of this paper is to address all three empirical challenges. We dis-
tinguish unobserved riskiness from riskiness that is observed by the lender but not by the
researcher, we allow for the e⁄ects of collateral, and we disentangle adverse selection from
moral hazard. We ￿nd robust evidence of adverse selection ￿ privately informed risky
borrowers are willing to pay higher interest rates than privately informed safer borrowers
are despite collateral requirements in place to deter them.
Our paper contributes to an empirical literature on adverse selection. This includes tests
for adverse selection in used car markets (Genesove 1993), annuity markets (Finkelstein and
2Poterba, 2004) and most speci￿cally, in credit markets (Ausubel 1999; Karlan and Zinman,
2007). We use a natural experiment involving a South Indian ￿nancial institution; Ausubel
(1993) and Karlan and Zinman (2007) use randomized ￿eld experiments. We are able to
isolate adverse selection from moral hazard, while Ausubel (1999) is not able to do so. We
￿nd much stronger evidence of adverse selection than Karlan and Zinman (2007) do. A
￿nal di⁄erence is that both Ausubel (1999) and Karlan and Zinman (2007) use data from
uncollateralized lenders. So unlike us they cannot test whether adverse selection persists
in the presence of collateral.
The ￿nancial arrangements we study are Roscas (or Rotating Savings and Credit Asso-
ciations). These are popular in many developing countries. In a Rosca, a group of people
get together regularly, each contributes a ￿xed amount, and at each meeting one of the
participants receives the collected pot. In random Roscas, the pot is awarded in each
round by lottery. In bidding Roscas, the subject of our study, the pot is awarded to the
highest bidder.1 Once a participant has received a pot he is ineligible to bid for another.
Such a participant may default (stop making contributions) after receiving the pot. Unlike
textbook ￿nancial markets, every participant in a bidding Rosca receives loans of di⁄erent
sizes and durations and at di⁄erent interest rates.
We test if riskiness is positively related to the willingness to pay by exploiting an ex-
ogenous policy shock. In September 1993; the government unexpectedly imposed a bid
ceiling (of 30% of the total pot). This ceiling typically binds in early rounds of bidding
Roscas transforming them into random Roscas since many participants bid up to the ceiling
but only one of them chosen by lottery receives the pot. To test for self selection based
on unobserved riskiness, we compare the riskiness pro￿le of borrowers before and after the
policy shock. Riskier borrowers who have a higher willingness to pay can simply outbid
the others and take early pots in the absence of the ceiling. But the ceiling e⁄ectively ties
their hands. Even though safer borrowers have lower willingness to pay for early pots, they
1The rationale for random and bidding Roscas has been examined by Anderson and Baland (2002),
Besley, Coate and Loury (1993), Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998), Klonner (2003, 2006) and Kovsted and
Lyk-Jensen (1999), among others.
3may still win early pots because of the lottery introduced by the ceiling. Riskier borrowers
are hence pushed back to later pots. In other words. the bid ceiling causes a ￿attening of
the riskiness pro￿le of borrowers. This is easiest to see in an extreme case: suppose the
bid ceiling were set at zero percent transforming the bidding Rosca into a purely random
Rosca. The average riskiness of all borrowers would be the same implying a completely
￿ at risk pro￿le.
We use a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence speci￿cation to capture this ￿ attening. We predict
that the di⁄erence between the riskiness of early and late borrowers is smaller after the policy
shock compared with before if there is self selection based on riskiness but is una⁄ected if
there is no such self selection. Borrower riskiness is unobserved, however; only default
rates are observed. We ￿nd that defaults are indeed ￿ atter as a result of the policy shock
exactly as predicted by selection. But default rates could be ￿ atter for reasons completely
unrelated to selection including (a) di⁄erences in riskiness observed by the lender but not
necessarily by the researcher (b) moral hazard (c) changes in the composition of Rosca
participants and (d) transitory aggregate shocks.
We address all four alternative explanations for the ￿ attening of default rates. We
need to isolate the privately observed from the publicly observed component of riskiness
to address concern (a) since we are interested in selection on the former and not on the
latter. We do so by controlling for the collateral required of borrowers since collateral
requirements have been shown to be based on observed riskiness (Berger and Udell 1995;
Jimenez, Salas and Saurina 2006; Liberti and Mian 2006). Since loan terms become more
favorable to early borrowers relative to late as a result of the ceiling, moral hazard could
cause the ￿ attening of observed defaults (concern b). So we control for loan terms while
taking the double di⁄erence in defaults to isolate adverse selection from moral hazard. We
address concern (c) by showing how our di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence test remains consistent even
if changes in the average riskiness of the pool of participants alone caused the ￿ attening of
default rates We exploit the overlaps in the Roscas started before and after the policy
shock to address concern (d). In all four cases we show how our estimator based on the
4conditional double di⁄erence in observed defaults consistently captures the double di⁄erence
in unobserved riskiness.
We ￿nd that borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates are riskier than those who
are not despite the use of collateral requirements. The ￿ attening of defaults caused by self
selection on unobserved riskiness is substantial. Our estimates suggest that defaults of early
borrowers fell by one-￿fth and defaults of later borrowers rose by one-￿fth as a consequence
of the bid ceiling.. We reject the null hypothesis of no self selection on unobserved riskiness.
This result is remarkably robust to alternative speci￿cations of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
test and to controls for observed riskiness, moral hazard and aggregate shocks.
We also examine the e⁄ect of a partial relaxation of the bid ceiling in 2002 on arrears
(overdues at the end of the loan term). We ￿nd that the 2002 reversal had the opposite
e⁄ect on arrears. Riskier participants could get their hands on early pots more easily after
2002 and so observed arrear pro￿les became steeper. In sum, exogenously capping interest
rates in 1993 ￿ attened the default pro￿le while relaxing the cap in 2002 made the arrear
pro￿le steeper exactly as predicted.
Financial constraints on development are a major academic and policy concern (Ar-
mendariz and Morduch, 2005; Banerjee 2003). Our results provide evidence of a speci￿c
impediment to ￿nancial access in developing countries. The bidding Roscas we study
are not small scale and personalized (as in Anderson, Baland and Moene 2004): Instead,
a commercial organizer arranges ￿nancial intermediation between Rosca participants who
have no social ties. The organizer takes on the default risk and receives a commission
in exchange. It is the Rosca organizer who imposes a collateral requirement (asks for
cosigners with regular salaries) on the winners of the pot based on how risky he perceives
them to be. Cosigners also potentially serve as a deterrent for unobserved riskiness, but we
￿nd that they are ine⁄ective in doing so.
Finally we brie￿ y clarify what we do not do in this paper.
1. We test for a speci￿c information asymmetry: Do borrowers have private information
on their own riskiness (or equivalently, dishonesty) that the Rosca organizer? There
5may of course be other unobserved characteristics on which borrowers di⁄er such as
impatience or productivity that have nothing to do with riskiness but a⁄ect a bor-
rower￿ s willingness to pay for an early pot. We do not test for asymmetric information
on those dimensions.
2. We ￿nd evidence that the bid ceiling does reduce self selection on unobserved riskiness.
We follow Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in referring to such self selection on riskiness as
"adverse" but we make no claims about whether such self selection (or the bid ceiling
that prevents self selection) has positive or negative welfare e⁄ects in bidding Roscas.2
Just as Ausubel (1999) and Karlan and Zinman (2007) therefore, we use the term
adverse selection throughout this paper to refer to the positive relationship between
willingness to pay and unobserved riskiness, not to the welfare loss relative to a full
information environment.
3. We do not claim either the presence or absence of moral hazard. At ￿rst glance it
might seem that the lottery introduced by the bid ceiling could be used to isolate
moral hazard. However identifying moral hazard in this way is impossible since only
the identity of the lottery winner but not of all lottery entrants is recorded.
Paper Outline
We motivate our empirical strategy in section 2. We provide additional background on
bidding Roscas in South India, and on the policy shock in section 3. We construct a
simple model of bidding Roscas when riskiness is unobserved in section 4. We discuss our
identi￿cation strategy in section 5. We discuss our main results from the 1993 policy shock
in section 6. We examine a reverse policy shock in 2002 as a robustness check in section
2In contrast with equilibrium credit rationing in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), credit rationing was exoge-
nously imposed here. While the bid ceiling constrained riskier borrowers, it also reduced participation in
Roscas which was undesirable from the Rosca organizer￿ s perspective. Presumably if the gains outweighed
the costs of imposing a bid ceiling, the Rosca organizer would have imposed it voluntarily in the absence of
any government intervention.
67. We conclude in section 8.
2 Motivating Examples
In this Section we introduce the rules of bidding Roscas before and after the 1993 policy
shock. We describe our empirical strategy for distinguishing adverse selection (on unob-
served risk) from selection on observed risk and from moral hazard. We do so through
some stylized examples. This section is intended to be an intuitive non-comprehensive
introduction to several issues that will taken up more carefully later in the paper.
Unrestricted and Restricted Roscas
Bidding Roscas match borrowers and savers. Each month participants contribute a ￿xed
amount to a pot. They then bid to receive the pot in an oral ascending bid auction where
previous winners are not eligible to bid. The highest bidder receives the pot of money less
the winning bid and the winning bid is distributed among all the members as a dividend.
Consequently, higher winning bids mean higher interest payouts to later recipients of the
pot. Over time, the winning bid typically falls as the duration for which the loan is taken
diminishes.
To illustrate these rules, consider a 3 person Rosca which meets once a month and each
participant contributes $10: Suppose the winning bid is $12 in the ￿rst month. Each
participant receives a dividend of $4: The recipient of the ￿rst pot e⁄ectively has a net
gain of $12 (i.e. the pot less the bid plus the dividend less the contribution). Suppose that
in the second month (when there are 2 eligible bidders) the winning bid is $6: And in the
￿nal month, there is only one eligible bidder and so the winning bid is 0:
We shall refer to the ￿rst recipient as the early borrower in what follows. The second
recipient saves $6 , then borrows $16 and ￿nally repays $10: Since we focus on the risk of
defaulting contributions owed subsequent to winning the pot in this paper, we will refer to
the second recipient as the late borrower in what follows. The net gains and contributions
7in this Rosca with unrestricted bidding are:
Example U
Month 1 2 3
Winning bid 12 6 0
Early Borrower 12 -8 -10
Late Borrower -6 16 -10
Saver -6 -8 20
The early recipient receives $12 and repays $8 and $10 in subsequent months (which implies
a 43% monthly interest rate). The ￿nal recipient is a pure saver: she saves $6 for 2 months
and $8 for a month and receives $20 (which implies a 25% monthly rate). Notice that an
unrestricted bidding Rosca allows participants to self select ￿a participant with a higher
willingness to pay can outbid another.
Next we discuss an example where bidding is restricted by the policy change. The bid
ceiling is 30% of the pot (or $9): In the ￿rst month, suppose that two participants are
willing to pay more than $9: Since bidding stops at the ceiling, one of the two is chosen by
lottery to receive the pot. The early recipient contributes $10, receives the pot less the
bid, $21; and also receives a dividend of $3; which provides a net gain of $14 in the ￿rst
month. Each of the other participants contributes $10 and receives a dividend of $3 in the
￿rst month. So the payo⁄s in this Rosca with restricted bidding are:
Example R
Month 1 2 3
Winning bid 9 6 0
Early Borrower 14 -8 -10
Late Borrower -7 16 -10
Saver -7 -8 20
The ceiling substantially lowers the interest rate on borrowing for the early borrower (and
8also the interest rate on savings for the saver). Further, the ceiling makes it di¢ cult for
participants to self select.
Empirical Approach
In example U; the early borrower has demonstrated a higher willingness to pay for the ￿rst
pot than the late borrower has for the ￿rst pot. If participants di⁄er in their inherent
riskiness, then a riskier participant will be be willing to pay more for the ￿rst pot than a
safer participant. This is an implication of adverse selection analogous to Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981). So riskier participants will all else equal choose early pots and safer participants
will choose later pots. It is possible that self selection in Roscas is based only on other
characteristics (e.g. impatience or productivity) but participants are all equally risky. In
such a case, the early borrower would be no riskier than the late borrower. There would be
no self selection on riskiness.
Riskiness is unobserved by the researcher however. We do have data on default rates,
i.e. on whether contributions have been made subsequent to receipt of the pot. The
empirical challenge is to infer whether there are di⁄erences in unobserved riskiness driving
self selection in Roscas when we just have data on di⁄erences in observed defaults.
Consider ￿rst a naive empirical approach: simply taking the di⁄erence between indi-
vidual default rates of early and late borrowers in example U. Adverse selection would
imply that early borrowers have higher default rates than late borrowers. But even if early
and late borrowers were inherently equally risky, there could be several other explanations
for this di⁄erence in defaults. For instance, the early borrower has to make contributions
at dates 2 and 3 while the late borrower has contributions due only at date 3: Assume
that the ￿rst contribution after receiving a pot is easier to make than the second. So for
this purely mechanical reason the early borrower may have a higher default rate than the
late borrower. Taking the di⁄erence in defaults between early and late borrowers does not
isolate adverse selection.
The restricted Rosca (example R) provides an opportunity to investigate default pat-
9terns when self selection is hampered. Consider another empirical approach: di⁄erence in
di⁄erences. If there were adverse selection, riskier participants should win early pots before
the ceiling but may not after the ceiling. For instance, the early borrower in example U
has clearly demonstrated his willingness to pay more for the ￿rst pot than the late borrower
has. So the early borrower will all else equal be riskier than the late borrower in example
U: But in example R; it is conceivable that the early borrower has a lower willingness to
pay for the ￿rst pot than the late borrower￿ s willingness to pay for the ￿rst pot. In such a
situation, the late borrower may be riskier than the early borrower. In other words, the bid
ceiling may impede self selection on riskiness by changing the order of receipt of the pot.
We would then expect to see a ￿ attening in the default pro￿le as we move from Example
U to Example R: In other words, the di⁄erence between default rates of early and late
borrowers should be higher in Example U than in Example R: But even if early and late
borrowers were inherently equally risky, there could be several alternative explanations for
a ￿ attening of the default pro￿le. For instance, the early borrower has more favorable
loan terms in the restricted Rosca relative to the early borrower in the unrestricted Rosca.
So moral hazard too would imply a ￿ attening of default rates as a consequence of the bid
ceiling.
Suppose that there were many three person Roscas all with a $10 contributions both
before and after the ceiling was imposed. The participants in these Roscas may di⁄er not
just in their riskiness but in other characteristics (such as impatience, productivity shocks
or urgency of consumption needs). The winning bid for the early borrower will vary across
unrestricted Roscas based on these di⁄erences. We shall exploit this variation and use
conditional di⁄erence in di⁄erences to isolate adverse selection from moral hazard. To
illustrate, imagine another three person Rosca with unrestricted bidding (example U0 say).
Suppose the winning bid in round 1 just happens to be $9 (which is 30% of the pot). There
is no lottery at date 1 and so the participant with the higher willingness to pay receives the
￿rst pot for certain. Suppose that the winning bid in the second round is $6: Payo⁄s are
10given by:
Example U0
Month 1 2 3
Winning bid 9 6 0
Early borrower 14 -8 -10
Late borrower -7 16 -10
Saver -7 -8 20
Suppose we compare Example U0 with Example R and do ￿nd that the default rates of
early and late borrowers are ￿ atter in example R than in example U0. Crucially, since loan
terms are the same for both borrowers in both examples the moral hazard explanation is
no longer valid. On the other hand, adverse selection would imply that the early borrower
is riskier than the second in Example U0 but not necessarily in Example R: So a ￿ attening
of defaults is consistent with adverse selection. In this way, by conditioning on winning
bids (comparing Example R with Example U0 instead of with example U) we will isolate
adverse selection from moral hazard. In section 5 we show that such a comparison will not
by itself raise any endogeneity concerns.
So far we have ignored the collateral requirement. It is possible that the early borrower
in example R has a collateral requirement while the early borrower in example U0 does
not. So even though loan sizes and repayment amounts are the same, the early borrower
in example U0 may be more likely to default if the collateral requirement prevents moral
hazard. To ensure that the ￿ attening is driven by adverse selection and not moral hazard
we would need to ensure that the collateral requirements were the same for early and late
borrowers in examples U0 and example R: In other words, we will control for all the loan
terms while taking the double di⁄erence in defaults.
Controlling for the collateral is important for another reason. A key empirical challenge
is that the researcher is uninformed about what the organizer observes about the borrowers.
Collateral required can be used as a summary measure of observed borrower riskiness.
The organizer will all else equal impose a stricter collateral requirement on borrowers who
11are known to be riskier than on borrowers known to be safer (as indicated by our ￿eld
interviews). By conditioning the double di⁄erence on defaults on the collateral requirement
we are able to ensure that it is di⁄erences in unobserved riskiness that we are capturing.
The collateral requirement may even be e⁄ective in deterring riskier borrowers from
taking early pots (when riskiness is privately observed). In other words, if the cosigner
requirement is e⁄ective in screening high risks we should see no ￿ attening of defaults when
we compare Roscas U0 and R (where both have the same collateral requirements). If we
￿nd a ￿ attening of defaults (as we do) for the examples, that implies that adverse selection
is a friction and the organizer has been unable to eliminate this problem through collateral.
Finally we ￿ ag two other identi￿cation concerns using these examples. Default dif-
ferences between early and late borrower in example R could be smaller than the same
di⁄erence in example U0 for reasons unrelated to adverse selection. For instance, suppose
there were no di⁄erences in inherent riskiness between participants but (a) there was an
aggregate shock in date 2 of Example U0 but no aggregate shock in Example R; or (b) the
participants in Rosca R were simply safer than those who participated in Rosca U0: In
both these situations the ￿ attening of defaults cannot be attributed to adverse selection.
We postpone our discussion of how our empirical approach deals with both these additional
concerns till section 5.
3 Data and Institutional Context
In this section we provide some background information on the bidding Roscas we study.
We describe the di⁄erent Rosca denominations in our sample and the e⁄ects of the policy
shock on bidding. We also discuss how contributions are enforced, how we calculate default
rates, and how default rates were a⁄ected by the 1993 policy shock.
12Denominations
In South India, Roscas originated in villages and small communities where participants were
informed about each other and could enforce contributions (Klonner 2004; Radhakrishnan
1975). The bidding Roscas in this study are larger scale and anonymous. Participants
typically do not know each other and the Rosca organizer (a commercial company) takes on
the risk of default. Bidding Roscas are a signi￿cant source of ￿nance in South India (where
they are called chit funds). Deposits in regulated chit funds were 12:5% of bank credit in
Tamil Nadu and 25% of bank credit in Kerala in the 1990s, and have been growing rapidly
(Eeckhout and Munshi 2004). There is also a substantial unregulated chit fund sector.
The data we use is from an established Rosca organizer with headquarters in Chennai.
The organizer (a non-bank ￿nancial company) began organizing Roscas in 1973 and has
been expanding gradually since then. The most common Rosca denomination o⁄ered in
the early 1990s meets for 40 months (with 40 members) and has a contribution of Rs. 250.
This Rosca has a pot of Rs. 10;000: The organizer also o⁄ers other Rosca denominations,
some with shorter durations (e.g. 25 months), others with longer durations (e.g. 50 months),
and some with higher contributions and some with lower contributions. In this way, the
organizer can match borrowers and savers into Roscas that vary based on investment size
and horizon. In what follows, we will refer to a Rosca of duration n (in months) and
contribution m as (n;m): Since all Roscas administered by the organizer meet once per
month, n also equals the number of members. The available pot is nm:
Policy Shock
In September 1993 the Supreme Court of India enforced the 1982 Chit Fund Act, which
stipulated (among other regulations) a 30% ceiling on bids for every Rosca denomination.
The stated purpose of the intervention was to prevent usurious interest rates. According to
the Rosca organizer, there was considerable uncertainty over which parts of the 1982 Chit
Fund would be enforced and when. Since the Supreme Court ruling was a surprise, it can
13reasonably be interpreted as an unanticipated policy shock (see also Eeckhout and Munshi
2004 who use the same policy shock to study matching among borrowers and savers).
The ceiling e⁄ectively converted bidding Roscas into partial random Roscas. If several
participants bid up to the ceiling only one of them received the pot by lottery.3 This rule
applied to all Roscas started after September 1993. Roscas that were started before Sep-
tember 1993 continued to operate without restrictions on bidding. According to Eeckhout
and Munshi (2004), interest rates fell from 14 ￿ 24% before the policy shock to 9 ￿ 17%
after the shock. This is in accordance with the stated objective of the policy which was to
prevent usurious interest rates in Roscas. The ceiling also created uncertainty about when
a participant would receive the pot.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, this bid ceiling was relaxed in 2002: We postpone
discussion of this reversal to Section 7.
Enforcement
Early borrowers clearly have an incentive to drop out and stop making contributions. The
organizer of the Roscas o⁄ers protection to participants against such defaults. If a borrower
fails to make a contribution, the organizer will contribute the funds in his place. The
organizer receives two forms of payment for taking on the default risk. He acts as a special
member of the Rosca who is entitled to the entire ￿rst pot (i.e. the ￿rst pot at a zero bid).
He also receives a commission (usually 5 ￿ 6 percent) of the pot in each round.
To enforce repayments, the organizer relies on a collateral (cosigner) requirement. Win-
ners of a pot are asked to provide cosigners (typically salaried employees) after they have
won the auction but before winnings are disbursed. Cosigners put their future incomes at
risk by agreeing to guarantee loans for a borrower ￿and the Rosca organizer enforces pay-
ment from cosigners of defaulting borrowers through a lengthy legal process. The organizer
3We observed the lottery procedure during a recent ￿eld visit. Plastic tags for all lottery entrants are
placed inside a large tin, then the tin is closed and shaken vigorously, and ￿nally one plastic tag is drawn at
random from the dark depths of the inside of the tin. The process is transparent and fair.
14also tries to discourage risky participants by requiring that all borrowers prove that they
have a regular income before pots are awarded to them. The threat of legal action against
both cosigners and borrowers provides incentives for participants to continue making contri-
butions even after they have received the pot. The organizer also told us that screening and
enforcement policies were the same across branches and these were not changed in response
to the policy shock.
Sample
For our core sample, we use Roscas that were started after September 1992 and before
October 1994 (the two year period around the implementation of the bid ceiling). This
has the advantage of taking care of potential seasonality of membership in Roscas as well
as providing a su¢ ciently large number of observations. The latter is especially crucial for
our analysis since default is a low probability event in our sample.
Our sample comprises those eleven denominations that were most popular around the
time of the policy shock. More precisely, we include all denominations in which the Rosca
organizer started at least 35 Roscas between October 1992 and September 1994. The
numbers of Roscas of di⁄erent denominations in the sample are in Table 1. According
to Table 1, there was a substantial decrease in the number of Roscas formed for most
of the Rosca denominations, including a drop of 20:8 percent for the popular (40;250)
denomination. Table 1 shows that 72% of the winning bids in the ￿rst half of Roscas of
this denomination hit the ceiling of Rs. 3000 after the policy shock. By way of comparison,
79:1% of the winning bids in the ￿rst half of unrestricted Roscas (i.e. before the policy
shock) were at or higher than Rs. 3000.
Since the Rosca organizer receives the ￿rst pot, and the last recipient owes no future
contributions, we only include data on recipients in rounds t 2 f2;:::;n￿1g for our analysis.
Between 10 and 25% of participants are institutional investors (depending on the Rosca
denomination). Since these investors never default, all pots allocated to them are also
excluded from the empirical analysis. Our sample then consists of the remaining non-
15institutional borrowers in Roscas that started after September 1992 but before September
1994. This gives a total of 46;269 observations, where each observation refers to the winner
in a particular round t in Rosca i of the 11 denominations in our sample.
Default Rates
We calculate the default rate of a member of Rosca i who receives the pot in round t
2 f1;:::;ng as
yti =
amount not repaid by round t borrower
amount owed by round t borrower
. (1)
So yti = 0 if the borrower has made all contributions, and yti = 1 if the borrower has made
no contributions after winning the pot. Partial defaults are observed in the data, which
means that yti is often less than 1.4 The average default rate in the sample is 1:23 percent
(Table 2).
In practice, the Rosca organizer updates repayments continuously as funds are collected
from borrowers and their cosigners. The legal process for collecting funds can take up to
four or ￿ve years since the courts are so slow. So default rates decrease over time in the
months and years after a Rosca has ended. We collected data on default rates for this
sample in January 2002: This is about ￿ve years after the conclusion of Roscas of the
popular (40; Rs 250) denomination that were started in 1994.
Loan Terms
There are three components of the loan terms for a round t winner of a Rosca: the cosigner
requirement ct; the winning bid bt and the repayment burden denoted qt: We discuss each
in turn. We use early and late throughout to refer to winners in the ￿rst and second half
of Roscas respectively.
We use two measures of the cosigner requirement. The ￿rst is cosigner incidence ￿one
or more cosigners were required for 39:3 percent of the entire sample (Table 2). The second
4When a participant stops making contributions before receiving a pot, she is excluded from the group
and replaced by another individual.
16is the number of cosigners, which on average was 0:71 but with considerable variation.
The bid ceiling did little to change the di⁄erence in cosigners required for early and late
recipients.
Winning bids were 35:07% of the pot on average for winners of early pots before the
bid ceiling of 30% was imposed. Winning bids for both early and late rounds dropped as a
result of the bid ceiling (in Table 2); but the drop was nearly six times as large for early
winners. Clearly a Rosca winner bene￿ts from a lower winning bid since he has to pay
less for the pot. In other words, the policy shock improved the loan terms for both early
and late borrowers but more so for early borrowers than for late borrowers.
We de￿ne the repayment burden qt as the sum of future (net) contributions that a Rosca
winner in round t must pay. Let bt be vector of winning bids in all rounds after date t of
the Rosca, bt = (bt+1;:::;bn). Notice that bn always equals zero since there is no auction
in the last round. That vector determines the repayment burden of the round t borrower.
In a Rosca with an individual contribution of m dollars per round the net payment that
a borrower has to make equals m ￿ bj=n in each round after receiving the pot, i.e. for
j = t + 1;:::;n ￿ 1. As a consequence, the (aggregate) repayment burden faced by the
round t borrower equals





To give an example, the repayment burden for the round 10 winner in a 40 round Rosca
is the sum of contributions less dividends in rounds 11 to 40: If there were no dividends
paid from rounds 11 to 40; then the repayment burden would be 75 percent of the pot. The
higher the dividends in subsequent rounds, the lower the repayment burden and hence the
more favorable the loan terms. Table 2 shows that the average repayment burden before
the policy shock across denominations for the winners of early pots (￿rst half of Roscas)
was 64:33 percent of the pot. The average of total contributions due in subsequent rounds
(i.e. the term (n￿t)m in equation (2)) is 75 percent of the pot. So the di⁄erence of 10:47
percent is the average dividends in the last three-quarters of the Roscas.
174 Theory
In this section we analyze a model of bidding Roscas in which borrowers di⁄er in their riski-
ness (or dishonesty) and are prone to unpredictable needs for cash. The model incorporates
the collateral (or cosigner) requirement that the Rosca organizer imposes on borrowers. We
analyze bidding behavior ￿rst in the absence of a ceiling (unrestricted bidding) and then in
the presence of a bid ceiling (restricted bidding). We show that if the collateral requirement
is not a su¢ cient deterrent riskier borrowers will on average be willing to bid more for a pot
than safer borrowers. Adverse selection then will refer to this positive relationship between
willingness to pay and riskiness. If there is adverse selection then the bid ceiling makes it
harder for riskier borrowers to take the early pots and then stop contributing subsequently.
We establish how the bid ceiling makes early borrowers safer and later borrowers riskier.
This ￿ attening of the riskiness pro￿le forms the basis for our empirical tests for adverse
selection in section 5.
The Model
The model has three agents and three dates indexed by t 2 f1;2;3g: Agents have additively
separable, risk-neutral intertemporal preferences. The per-period individual discount factor
is denoted by ￿ < 1: Agents are endowed with an income stream of $1 per period. Two
of the agents are borrowers and one is a pure saver. Following Besley, Coate and Loury
(1993) we shall allow for "lumpiness" in the use of Rosca winnings. Borrowers have a
￿xed investment or purchase of size 3 at dates 1 and 2, while the saver does not. We shall
index borrowers by ￿; where ￿ 2 fL;Hg. A borrower￿ s type ￿ refers to inherent riskiness or
equivalently to the probability of default. One of the borrowers is safer, type L; while the
other is riskier, type H; where 1 ￿ H ￿ L ￿ 0:
Following Calomiris and Rajaraman (1998) and Klonner (2003), we shall assume that
borrowers have unpredictable needs for cash that drives participation in Roscas. Borrowers
draw idiosyncratic productivity/utility shocks at dates 1 and 2: A borrower of type ￿ re-
18ceives an instantaneous payo⁄x￿
t from funding her cash needs where t 2 f1;2g. Throughout
this section we will refer to random variables by upper case letters, and their realizations
by lower case letters. We assume that X￿
t is independently and identically uniformly dis-








Agents form a bidding Rosca that meets at dates 1; 2 and 3: There is an open ascending
bid auction at dates 1 and 2. Let the winning bid at each date be denoted bt: There is no
auction at date 3 because there is only one eligible bidder and so the winning bid b3 = 0:
The model has been chosen so that the saver always wins the date 3 pot and the borrowers
win at dates 1 and 2: Each agent contributes $1 at date 1 but borrowers may default
on contributions in subsequent rounds. The date 1 borrower either pays the date 2 and
date 3 contribution with probability 1 ￿ ￿ or pays neither contribution with probability
￿. Similarly the date 2 borrower pays the third contribution with probability 1 ￿ ￿ and
defaults with probability ￿ at date 3. The Rosca organizer takes on the risk of default,
and contributes $1 if the winner of a pot does not continue to pay.5 We shall assume for
tractability that the riskiness of each borrower ￿ and the realization of the shock x￿
t are
observed by all Rosca participants. But the Rosca organizer does not observe riskiness ￿
and the shock x￿
t ￿and so cannot distinguish the riskier type from the safer type.
The Rosca organizer imposes a collateral requirement for winners of pots. Even though
the organizer cannot make this collateral requirement contingent on the winner￿ s type, the
cost of providing the same collateral may vary between risky and safe types. We assume
that the collateral causes an immediate loss in expected utility of ￿￿ ￿ 0 per dollar owed in
present value terms. For instance, just as in Bester (1985) or Besanko and Thakor (1987)
collateral costs are likely to be higher for the risky borrower than for the safe borrower:
￿H > ￿L. In our context ￿￿ can be interpreted as the bribe that a borrower must pay a
cosigner in order to o⁄set the cosigner￿ s expected loss from default. Since a riskier borrower
has to pay a higher bribe than a safer borrower, this would imply that ￿H > ￿L. In what
5To keep the model simple, we abstract from any commission that the Rosca organizer is paid for per-
forming this enforcement role. None of our results would be a⁄ected by including such a commission.
19follows, we do not restrict ￿H > ￿L however.
We shall interpret this model fairly broadly. Our interviews with bidding Rosca par-
ticipants in South India suggest that funds are used both for investment needs of small
businesses and for consumption needs in households. These cash needs are sometimes un-
predictable. Under an entrepreneurial ￿nance interpretation, the project size of 3 refers to
a ￿xed investment size and the x￿
t refers to an immediate income from a productivity shock.
Under a consumption ￿nance interpretation, the project size of 3 refers to the size of the
consumption expenditure and the instantaneous utility of x￿
t is associated with satisfying
an urgent consumption need. In either interpretation, a participant fails to make his or her
contribution after winning the pot with probability ￿. If H > L; we can think of either (a)
the high type is more dishonest than the low type, (b) the high type has a riskier project
than the low type does or (c) the high type is better at hiding his money from the Rosca
organizer than the low type is. Even though we model cash needs as unpredictable, our
results would be una⁄ected if cash needs were anticipated instead, i.e. both x￿
1 and x￿
2 were
realized at the beginning of date 1.
Next we discuss the payo⁄s to the participants in the Rosca. Let bt be the winning
bid at the date t auction when bidding is unrestricted. (When bidding is restricted by
ceiling b then denote the winning bids as bc
t; where bc
t ￿ b for each t). The winning bidder
receives the pot of $3 and, according to the rules, pays two thirds of the winning bid to the
other losing bidders. Thus the winner at date 1 receives 3 ￿ 2
3b1. She needs additional
￿nance of 2
3b1 to undertake the project. As in Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (1999), we assume
that each member has access to costly external funds to ￿nance this di⁄erence between the
amount received from the Rosca upon winning the auction and the cost of the project. Each
dollar borrowed from this source causes an instantaneous disutility of k > 1.6 To provide
a rationale for the existence of Roscas, we assume that, on average, it is not pro￿table to
6This assumption is purely for analytical convenience; our results would be unchanged if borrowers had
no access to outside funds and project size was variable.
20￿nance the investment from only concurrent income and the costly external source of funds,
E(X) ￿ 2k < 1
where E(X)￿2k is the expected instantaneous utility of a borrower who invests (he needs
external ￿nance of 2 which equals the cost of 3 minus his current income of 1). The right
hand side is the payo⁄ to an autarkic individual who does not invest, which equals her unit
income. Since EX = ￿; we can state this assumption as:
Assumption 1 Investment is not pro￿table in the absence of Rosca funding,
￿ < 1 + 2k: (3)
Next de￿ne a borrower of type ￿￿ s willingness to pay for a date t pot as gt(xt;￿￿) where
￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿￿: Explicit expressions for gt(xt;￿￿) are derived in the appendix by equating
a borrower￿ s payo⁄ between winning the pot at date t and waiting till date t+1: Since we
observe that winning bids are always non-negative, we shall assume that willingness to pay
in the second auction is always non-negative.
Assumption 2 The winning bid in the second auction is always positive, g2(x;￿￿) ￿ 0 for





￿ ￿ ￿￿ (4)
Condition 4 states that individuals discount future income su¢ ciently to always ensure
a positive willingness to pay for the second pot. Notice that ￿￿￿=2 is the lower bound of
X and ￿ ￿ ￿￿ is type ￿￿ s gain in utility from winning the third pot.
By de￿nition, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)￿ s model implies that riskier borrowers have a
higher willingness to pay than safer borrowers if there is no collateral required. In this
paper though we wish to investigate if collateral can successfully overcome such self selection
based on riskiness. In our model, any di⁄erences in willingness to pay for a pot will depend
not just on di⁄erences in riskiness but also di⁄erences in collateral costs ￿￿. If collateral
is a su¢ cient deterrent, then the risky type will not have a higher willingness to pay than
21the safe type. The following proposition thus characterizes when self selection based on
riskiness persists despite the collateral requirement, and when self selection is eliminated
or even reversed because of the collateral requirement. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
Proposition 1 (Riskiness, Collateral Costs and Willingness to Pay for the First
Pot)
Conditional on the utility shock x,
(i) The riskier borrower has a higher willingness to pay for the ￿rst pot than the safe borrower
does, g1(x;￿H) > g1(x;￿L); if and only if
H ￿ ￿H > L ￿ ￿L: (5)
(ii) Both types have the same willingness to pay for the ￿rst pot, g1(x;￿H) = g1(x;￿L) if
and only if
H ￿ ￿H = L ￿ ￿L (6)
(iii) The riskier borrower has a lower willingness to pay for the ￿rst pot than the safe
borrower does, g1(x;￿H) < g1(x;￿L) if and only if
H ￿ ￿H < L ￿ ￿L (7)
Proposition 1 makes precise the condition (5) under which adverse selection cannot be
eliminated by the collateral requirement. In this context a positive di⁄erence in borrower
riskiness, i.e. H > L is not su¢ cient for adverse selection. Instead this di⁄erence has to
be su¢ ciently large relative to the di⁄erence in the costs of providing collateral. For such
a case, ￿gure 2 depicts the borrowers￿willingness to pay functions. The g1 functions are
parallel with g1(x;￿H) being larger than g1(x;￿L) for any given x.
On the other hand, there may indeed be no adverse selection even though there are
unobserved di⁄erences in riskiness provided collateral is a su¢ cient deterrent (6). Finally,
the proposition gives a case where the riskier borrower may have a lower willingness to pay
than the safe borrower for the ￿rst pot because the collateral requirement is an excessive
deterrent.
22Unrestricted Bidding
We ￿rst discuss how winning bids are determined in the absence of the bid ceiling. Unlike
standard auctions, the losers in any Rosca auction receive a one-third share of the winning
bid ￿and so have an incentive to bid up the winner to her willingness to pay. In the
equilibrium of this sequential auction game, the borrower with the higher willingness to pay
wins the ￿rst auction at a winning bid equal to her willingness to pay for the ￿rst pot, while
the other borrower wins the second pot at a winning bid equal to his willingness to pay for








Since each borrower￿ s willingness to pay for the ￿rst pot is higher than for the second pot,
on average this implies a decreasing winning bid over the course of a Rosca, a feature well
in accordance with auction outcomes in actual Roscas.
Since XL
1 and XH
1 are independently and identically distributed, the high type is more
likely to win the pot if condition (5) holds. Nevertheless there will be situations where a
low type has a shock su¢ ciently larger than the high type￿ s shock and so will win the ￿rst
pot even if (5) holds.
Restricted Bidding
We turn to the e⁄ect of the bid ceiling b on winning bids. When bidding reaches b, there
is a lottery with equal odds among all bidders interested in obtaining the pot at that price.
We focus on a speci￿c case in which the e⁄ect of the ceiling on riskiness is most clearly
demonstrated. We will assume that the ceiling never binds in the second round. In the
￿rst round we require that the ceiling is interior: each borrower￿ s willingness to pay for the
￿rst pot may be larger or smaller than b with positive probability. To illustrate in Figure
2: we require that the ceiling is larger than the ordinate of the left-most point on the dashed
line and smaller than the ordinate of the right-most point of the solid line.
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Part (i) of this assumption ensures that the willingness to pay functions in the ￿rst auc-




in part (ii) ensures that the ceiling does have an e⁄ect on the identity of the winner of the




< b ensures that the ceiling is not always
reached as is the case in the data.













> > > <
> > > :
g2(x￿
2;￿argmin￿ g1(x￿
1;￿￿)), if min￿ g1(x￿
1;￿￿) < b
g2(xL
2;￿L) with probability 1
2
g2(xH
2 ;￿H) with probability 1
2
; if min￿ g1(x￿
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where the superscript c indicates the presence of the bid ceiling. Notice that, in the
￿rst round, a lottery between the two borrowers only takes place when both borrowers￿
willingness to pay exceeds b. If only one borrower is willing to pay more than b, the other
will not choose to join the lottery once bidding has reached b: Similarly, the saver will never
join a lottery though he will drive the winning bid up to b if at least one of the borrowers
is willing to pay that amount.
Testable Implications
The bid ceiling makes it harder for riskier participants to get their hands on the ￿rst pot
when adverse selection persists despite the collateral requirement (condition 5). Let us
24illustrate the argument with Figure 2: Let b x￿ be the utility shock that makes type ￿￿ s
willingness to pay for the ￿rst pot exactly equal to the bid ceiling, i.e.
g1(b x￿;￿￿) = b; ￿ 2 fL;Hg:
Provided that xH
1 ￿ b xH or xL
1 ￿ b xL; the identity and hence the type of the winner will
be the same as in an auction without a ceiling, but not otherwise. When xH
1 > b xH and
xL
1 > b xL, a lottery with equal odds determines which one of the borrower gets the ￿rst pot
while, with no ceiling, the H type is more likely to win.
This is made precise in Figure 3. Panel A depicts a situation with adverse selection and
no bid ceiling. As each bidder￿ s willingness to pay is distributed uniformly, the probability
of the H type winning the ￿rst auction is
the area of the polygon ABCDF
the area of the square ABCE
Panel B depicts the analogous situation with a bid ceiling of b in place. Here a lottery
determines the winner when the willingness to pay are in the rectangle IGCH, which
corresponds to xH
1 > b xH and xL
1 > b xL. As the H type wins the lottery with probability
one half, we may depict the corresponding area by the triangle IGC: Thus the total
probability of the H type winning the ￿rst pot is
the area of the polygon ABCIF
the area of the square ABCE
In this example, the ceiling reduces the probability of the high risk type winning the ￿rst
auction by the triangle ICD relative to the square ABCE.
In other words, the di⁄erence in riskiness between high and low types plays less of a
role in determining the winner in round 1 of restricted Roscas compared with unrestricted
Roscas. As the bid ceiling b approaches 0 for instance, the restricted Rosca approaches a
purely random Rosca, and the probabilities of winning for the two types converge to one
half. Let E(￿1) and E(￿c
1) be the expected riskiness of the winner of the ￿rst pot without
and with a ceiling in place. Then the expected riskiness falls as a result of the bid ceiling,
E(￿1) > E(￿c
1).
25In contrast consider a situation where collateral eliminates adverse selection (condition
6), as illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. If both borrowers receive a utility shock xH
1 ￿ x￿ and
xL
1 ￿ x￿; then there is a lottery just as before in the presence of a bid ceiling. On average,
the riskier borrower has no higher willingness to pay than the safe borrower as in Figure 4:
The expected riskiness of the date 1 winner is una⁄ected by the bid ceiling. In Figure 5
this results in the points C and D of Figure 3 coinciding. So the probability of the high
risk type winning the ￿rst auction without and with a ceiling in place corresponds to the
area of the triangle ABC relative to the square ABCE which is of course precisely one half.
Hence, in this case expected riskiness of borrowers is equalized, E(￿1) = E(￿c
1):
The main implication of our model is that the bid ceiling makes the average riskiness
of participants more equal over time if there is adverse selection but not otherwise. This
￿attening of types ￿the riskier type is pushed to a later pot while the safer type is more
likely receive the earlier pots after the ceiling ￿is what we will use to identify if adverse
selection persists despite the collateral requirement. Recall that E(￿t) and E(￿c
t) refers to
expected riskiness of date t borrowers before and after the ceiling is imposed, where t = 1
are early borrowers and t = 2 are late borrowers.
Proposition 2 (Testable Implication)
(i) If there is adverse selection, as in (5), then early borrowers are riskier before the ceiling





So the di⁄erence in di⁄erence in expected riskiness is positive
E(￿1 ￿ ￿c
1) ￿ E(￿2 ￿ ￿c
2) > 0 (8)
(ii) If there is no adverse selection, as in (6), then there is no di⁄erence in either early or
late riskiness
E(￿1 ￿ ￿c
1) = E(￿2 ￿ ￿c
2) = 0
26and so the di⁄erence in di⁄erence in expected riskiness is zero
E(￿1 ￿ ￿c
1) ￿ E(￿2 ￿ ￿c
2) = 0 (9)
(iii) If collateral is an excessive deterrent, as in (7), then early borrowers are safer before






So the di⁄erence in di⁄erence in expected riskiness is negative.
E(￿1 ￿ ￿k
1) ￿ E(￿2 ￿ ￿k
2) < 0 (10)
In other words, when there is adverse selection despite the collateral requirement, re-
stricted bidding ￿ attens the risk pro￿le. With restricted bidding, the winner of the ￿rst
pot is on average less risky while the winner of the second pot is more risky than with
unrestricted bidding, as in Figure 6. In contrast, when there is no adverse selection (or col-
lateral is e⁄ective at equalizing the costs of default for risky and safe types), the risk pro￿le
is completely ￿ at with unrestricted as well as with restricted bidding. The risk pro￿le is
una⁄ected by the policy shock as in Figure 7. So our empirical strategy (which we discuss
in detail in section 5) will be to take the di⁄erence between the slopes of the riskiness pro￿le
of borrowers before and after the ceiling is imposed. That di⁄erence is positive only with
adverse selection (as in Figure 6 and equation 8).
Our null hypothesis that willingness to pay is unrelated to riskiness will be (9). Note
that we will conduct a two sided test of the null of no adverse selection. E⁄ectively we
are testing for either of two alternatives (a) riskier borrowers have a higher willingness to
pay than safer borrowers because collateral is an insu¢ cient deterrent (equation 8) or (b)
riskier borrowers have a lower willingness to pay than safer borrowers because collateral is
an excessive deterrent (equation 10). In the latter case, the Rosca organizer has simply set
the collateral requirement such that there is a steepening of the risk pro￿le as a consequence
27of the ceiling. This is certainly an empirical possibility ￿collateral may sometimes be "too
e⁄ective" at deterring risk.
5 Identi￿cation
Our goal is to test for self selection based on riskiness in these Roscas. Such self selection
implies that the policy shock will have a ￿ attening e⁄ect on the riskiness pro￿le of Rosca
borrowers (Proposition 2). As discussed earlier the policy shock was unanticipated. So
we are not confronted with any selection bias arising from deliberate choices by prospective
Rosca members about whether to join unrestricted Roscas that started before September
1993 or to wait to join restricted Roscas that started after that date.
We do not observe the riskiness of Rosca participants however; we only observe their
default rates. In section 3, we have described how the policy shock did lead to ￿ attening
of defaults. But one Rosca participant may have a higher default rate than another for
a variety of reasons that are completely unrelated to inherent riskiness. We shall explain
our identi￿cation strategy by ￿rst assuming as a benchmark that defaults only depend
on riskiness, and then adding on other potential determinants of defaults (loan terms,
compositional changes, aggregate shocks). Our aim is to make precise how the ￿ attening
e⁄ect on riskiness implied by the theory can be captured by empirical speci￿cations that
test for ￿ attening in default rates.
In all that follows in this section, we shall consider the special case of Roscas with
three participants and three dates. Only the ￿rst two recipients are at risk of default in
such Roscas. As before, the term early borrower will refer to the date 1 recipient and the
term late borrower will refer to the date 2 recipient. This will then allow us to consider
identi￿cation problems in light of the theory developed in section 4.
28Benchmark
To test if riskier borrowers have a higher willingness to pay than safer borrowers, we will
take the di⁄erence in di⁄erences in default rates between early and late borrowers before
and after the policy shock. The benchmark econometric speci￿cation
yti = ￿t + ￿ afteri + ￿ afteri latet + uti; (11)
where t denotes the round of receipt of the pot, and i indexes Roscas of a particular
denomination. The unit of observation yti is the individual default rate of the borrower in
round t of Rosca i. The intercept term ￿t is round speci￿c. The dummy variable afteri
equals one if Rosca i started after the policy shock and zero otherwise. The dummy variable
latet is an indicator for whether the borrower in round t was a late (as opposed to an early)
borrower. The interaction term afteri latet interacts the indicator for before/after policy
shock with the indicator for early/late receipt of the pot.
The least-squares estimate of ￿ is the di⁄erence between (i) the di⁄erence in the average
default rate of borrowers of early and late pots with unrestricted bidding and (ii) the
di⁄erence in the average default rate of borrowers of early and late pots with restricted
bidding. If risk and willingness to pay are positively related then the ceiling ￿ attens the
default pro￿le and the double di⁄erence ￿ > 0 as in equation (8) in Proposition 2. If
unobserved risk and willingness to pay are negatively related then there is steepening of
defaults and ￿ < 0 as in equation (8). Finally, if unobserved risk and willingness to pay
are unrelated then there is no ￿ attening or steepening of the default pro￿le. This is the
null hypothesis in equation 9.
The critical question for identi￿cation is whether such a test is valid. In other words,
does the double di⁄erence of observed default rates capture the double di⁄erence of unob-
served riskiness? For expositional purposes, we shall ￿rst consider a hypothetical case
in which it does. Assume that defaults are only generated by unobserved riskiness ￿u and
measured with error. Assume the benchmark default generating process is:
yti = ￿t + ￿t￿u
ti + ￿it (12)
29The parameter ￿t > 0 represents the e⁄ect of unobserved riskiness on defaults while the
parameter ￿t is a round speci￿c intercept:
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1 is the expected di⁄erence in riskiness for early rounds and E￿u
2 ￿ E￿uc
2
is the expected di⁄erence in riskiness for late rounds (the superscript c refers to Roscas
that are restricted by the bid ceiling). Recall that, according to Proposition 2, ￿ attening
through a ceiling on bids decreases the average riskiness of early borrowers, E￿u
1 > E￿uc
1 ;
and increases the average riskiness of late borrowers E￿u
2 < E￿uc
2 . So under the null,
limN!1 b ￿ = 0 but under the alternative limN!1 b ￿ > 0: For this admittedly unrealistic
benchmark case, the test for adverse selection is consistent.
What if the collateral requirement is enough to deter unobservably riskier people from
taking early pots? If condition (6) holds, then there is no adverse selection ￿the null
hypothesis. Recall in this connection that, theoretically, there could be no adverse selection
either because markets (or collateral) work e¢ ciently to overcome the adverse selection
problem or because borrowers do not di⁄er in their unobserved riskiness even in the absence
of collateral.
In the data, defaults may be a⁄ected by observed riskiness, loan terms, composition of
risks and by aggregate shocks in addition to unobserved riskiness. In such departures from
(12), the estimated double di⁄erence of defaults in speci￿cation (11) may capture more or
less than the double di⁄erence in unobserved riskiness ￿and so a test that rejects the null
hypothesis of no adverse selection on the basis of speci￿cation (11) may be inconsistent.
In what follows we discuss how we augment the speci￿cation (11) so that we can identify
adverse selection when the defaults are not generated by (12).
30Observed Riskiness
In practice defaults are certainly not generated only by unobserved riskiness as we assumed
in (12). In this subsection we shall ￿rst pose the problem ￿ the unconditional double
di⁄erence of defaults in speci￿cation (11) picks up both observed and unobserved riskiness.
Then we shall discuss a solution altering our estimation strategy to account for di⁄erences
in observed riskiness.
Assume that riskiness comprises both observed and unobserved components, ￿ti = ￿u
ti +
￿o
ti: Suppose defaults depend only on riskiness
yti = ￿u
t + ￿u
t ￿ti + ￿it; (13)
then if we run the benchmark econometric speci￿cation (11), there will be an omitted
variable bias. We will pick up both the double di⁄erence in observed and the double
di⁄erence in unobserved riskiness,
lim
N!1
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where it is just the ￿rst term that we are interested in. We would like to isolate the double
di⁄erence in unobserved riskiness.
We need an appropriate measure of the Rosca organizer￿ s information on borrower risk-
iness as a control in speci￿cation (11). As we discussed in section 4, the organizer imposes
a collateral requirement on borrowers after they have won the pot. In practice, this col-
lateral requirement is an attempt to prevent defaults and, according to the organizer, does
depend on all observed factors relevant for expected defaults. We next show that the double
di⁄erence of defaults conditional on collateral required can isolate unobserved riskiness.
Suppose ￿rst that the only such observed factor that determines whether collateral is





31Substituting (15) into (13) and solving gives a default generating process that depends






















So the following regression will capture the ￿ attening in unobserved riskiness,
yti = ￿t + ￿ afteri + ￿ afteri latet + ￿t cti + uti: (16)
Here ￿ estimates the double di⁄erence in defaults conditional on the cosigner requirement,
lim
N!1
b ￿ = ￿u
1(E￿u
1 ￿ E￿uc





Observed defaults may not only be a function of a borrower￿ s inherent riskiness, but also
of the terms at which the loan is obtained. The winning bid and the repayment burden
(de￿ned at the end of section 3) are two components of the loan terms. A third component
is the collateral requirement. Recall that the ￿ attening of the winning bid as a consequence
of the policy shock improved the loan terms for early borrowers more than it did for late
borrowers. For moral hazard reasons, then one would expect a ￿ attening of default rates
after the policy shock. Further for completely mechanical reasons as well, favorable loan
terms can lead to reductions in defaults and confound tests of asymmetric information
(Karlan and Zinman 2007). We cannot separate out the moral hazard and mechanical
e⁄ects of the policy shock, but we can try to isolate adverse selection from both these e⁄ects.
In this section we shall explain in detail how we augment our empirical speci￿cation to allow
for changes in winning bids, repayment burdens and the collateral requirement.
Suppose defaults depended on inherent riskiness and the terms at which a participant
obtained the pot
yti = ￿t0 + ￿u
t ￿ti + ￿t1bti + ￿t2qti+￿t3cti + ￿it; (17)
32then a test that rejects the null hypothesis of no adverse selection on the basis of speci￿cation
(16) is inconsistent because of the omitted variables (the loan terms). In such a test, the
estimate b ￿ would capture the double di⁄erence in riskiness and the change in loan terms
on default.
The cosigner requirement in turn may depend on the loan terms (winning bid and
repayment burden) in addition to depending on observed riskiness. So we can augment
(15) to
cti = gt0 + ￿o
t￿o
ti + gt1bti + gt2qti (18)
We can rewrite the default generating process for yti so that it only depends on unob-
served riskiness ￿u
i and not on observed riskiness. This involves substituting (18) into (17)







t3cti + ￿it (19)
where
￿0





gtj for j = 0;1;2
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Based on (19), we can augment speci￿cation (16) to include loan terms: winning bid
and repayment burden. We run the following regression where ￿ now denotes the double
di⁄erence in defaults conditional on loan terms
yti = ￿t + ￿ afteri + ￿ afteri latet + ￿t cti +  tbti + ￿tqti + uti; (20)
Next we show that limN!1 b ￿ = 0 under the null of no adverse selection. In other
words, controlling for the loan terms leads to a consistent test for adverse selection. Note
33that limN!1 b ￿ equals
e0
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(21)
where e0 = [1 0 0 0], e ￿
u
t denotes the unobserved riskiness of a round t borrower as a random
variable. Under the null hypothesis, e ￿
u
t has no variation, as all borrowers are of identical
unobserved riskiness. So the two covariance terms in (21) are vectors of zeros which implies
limN!1 b ￿ = 0.
Rosca Composition
In our data, individuals are not randomly assigned into unrestricted and restricted groups.
Instead, only unrestricted Roscas were started before September 30; 1993, and only re-
stricted ones after that date. Ideally for the researcher, an identical set of individuals
signed up Roscas of a particular denomination before and after September 1993. But there
are plausible reasons why the characteristics of Rosca participants may be di⁄erent before
and after the ceiling for Roscas of the same denomination. First, individuals may choose to
join a di⁄erent denomination when confronted with restricted instead of unrestricted bid-
ding. Second, an individual who chooses to sign up for a certain Rosca denomination when
bidding is unrestricted may choose not to join a Rosca and seek other forms of ￿nance in-
stead when bidding is restricted. This latter argument could, at least in principle, also work
conversely: an individual for whom other sources of ￿nance dominate a Rosca membership
with unrestricted bidding may decide to join a Rosca when bidding is restricted.
In this section, we do not take a theoretical stand on how participants of di⁄erent
riskiness may sort themselves across Rosca denominations as a result of the policy shock.7
7Eeckhout and Munshi 2004 ￿nd that borrowers and savers sort themselves across Rosca denominations
before and after the policy shock in predictable ways. Since participants have no default risk both in their
34Nor do we try to theoretically predict whether safer or riskier borrowers would choose to
join or drop out of the overall pool of Rosca participants. Instead, we analyze whether
our empirical test for adverse selection remains consistent under alternative assumptions
about non-random assignment into Roscas before and after the policy shock. In particular,
suppose that the null hypothesis were true. There are no di⁄erences in willingness to pay
according to inherent riskiness between Rosca participants, both before and after the policy
shock (and therefore, no adverse selection). The pool of participants after the shock may
be riskier or safer than those before, however.
In terms of our 3 period model, the two borrowers have riskiness ￿1;H = ￿1;H ￿￿1;H =
￿1;L ￿￿1;L = ￿1;L before, and ￿2;H ￿￿2;H = ￿2;L ￿￿2;L = ￿2 after the policy shock, where
potentially ￿1;H 6= ￿2;H and ￿1;L 6= ￿2;L. Notice that in this case we have E￿1 = E￿2 =
(￿1;L + ￿1;H)=2 ￿ ￿1 and E￿c
1 = E￿c
2 = (￿2;L + ￿2;H)=2 ￿ ￿2: The question is whether such
a shift in riskiness could lead to a nonzero estimate of ￿: To give an answer, we consider
the probability limit of b ￿ as given by expression (21), which applies if (as before) defaults
are generated by (19).
Proposition 3 (Change in Rosca Composition) If there is no adverse selection in
Roscas with and without a bid ceiling, i.e. ￿1;L = ￿1;H and ￿2;L = ￿2;H,











2(￿1 ￿ ￿2)2 > 0:
Part (i) of Proposition 3 gives conditions for when our test will inconsistent when if is no
adverse selection and only a change in levels of riskiness. Whether the limit of b ￿ is di⁄erent
from zero depends crucially on how riskiness translates into default rates in di⁄erent rounds
of a Rosca. If ￿u
1 = ￿u
2, our test will be consistent, as is the case in our theoretical model,
where ￿u
1 = ￿u
2 = 1: If there are round-speci￿c di⁄erences in how defaults depend on
riskiness then our test will be inconsistent.
Part (ii) of Proposition 3 states a property of the coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿ in estimating
equation (20) when there is no adverse selection and only a change in average riskiness.
theory and empirics, however, their results are not directly applicable to our study.
35Notice that ￿ captures the change in defaults of early borrowers and ￿ + ￿ the change in
defaults of late borrowers. With a change in average riskiness but no adverse selection, the
conditional default pro￿les before and after the policy change do not intersect and hence
early and late defaults move in the same direction. This is illustrated in Figure 8, Panel B.
With adverse selection and no change in average riskiness, on the other hand, the default
pro￿les will intersect (Figure 8, Panel A), which corresponds to the situation in Figure 6.
So, provided we ￿nd that ￿ > 0, a test that it is solely a change in composition (and not
adverse selection) that is causing ￿ > 0; is sign(￿) = sign(￿ + ￿) or ￿(￿ + ￿) > 0. If the
signs are equal then there is no intersection of default pro￿les while if the signs are di⁄erent,
the null hypothesis of no adverse selection can be con￿dently rejected: Notice that this test
is conservative as it will also fail to reject if there is adverse selection but, simultaneously,
a su¢ ciently large change in the average riskiness of Rosca participants such that the two
default pro￿les do not intersect.
Aggregate Shocks
We turn ￿nally to another explanation for why the double di⁄erence in observed defaults
may not correspond with the double di⁄erence in unobserved riskiness. Rosca participants
may experience transitory aggregate shocks unobserved by the researcher. For instance,
there may be no di⁄erences in inherent riskiness, yet it is changes in aggregate shocks that
drive the ￿ attening of defaults. Just as in previous subsections, there is an omitted variable
bias in speci￿cation (20) because aggregate shocks are ignored.
We control for such aggregate shocks by exploiting the fact that unrestricted and re-
stricted groups in our sample overlap. To account for transitory aggregate shocks, we aug-
ment (20) by quarterly time dummies. Indexing quarters by j, we introduce the dummy
quarterjti, which equals one for all observations in which round t of Rosca i is in quarter j:
We rewrite (20) as
yti = ￿t + ￿ afteri + ￿ afteri latet + ￿t cti +  tbti + ￿tqti + ￿j quarterjti + uti (22)
36As a consequence, identi￿cation of adverse selection ￿ is solely based on di⁄erences in
defaults of contemporaneous borrowers.
To illustrate, consider the Rosca denomination (40;250) and Roscas that started between
October 1992 and September 1994. The overlap between unrestricted and restricted Roscas
in such a sample ranges from 39 months for two Roscas that started in September and
October 1993, respectively, and 17 months for two Roscas that started in October 1992
and September 1994, respectively. The period covered by such a sample is 63 months,
from October 1992 to December 1997. With a partition of that time period into quarters,
we arrive at 20 dummy variables (starting with the ￿rst quarter of 1993 and ending with
the last quarter of 1997). It is these quarterly dummies that we use in the regression
speci￿cation (22).
Notice that we are assuming that transitory aggregate shocks a⁄ect defaults identically
in di⁄erent rounds of the Rosca. If aggregate shocks a⁄ected, say, the defaults of round 5
winners di⁄erently from defaults of round 35 winners, then interacting quarterly dummies
with rounds could pick up some of the variation and allow for a ￿ attening of the default
pro￿le. But this would substantially reduce the degrees of freedom.
6 Results from the 1993 Policy Shock
In what follows we shall ￿rst motivate our regression analysis with evidence from simple
means comparisons. We proceed to discuss how to partition Roscas into early and late
rounds. We then describe our main results testing for adverse selection and examine their
robustness.
Simple Differences in Differences
We are interested in how default rates were a⁄ected by the bid ceiling. The average
individual default rate remained virtually unchanged from 1:3% before to 1:2% after the
37policy shock.8 A dramatic change occurred in the timing of defaults, however (see Table
2). Individual default rates in early rounds dropped from 2:04 percent to 1:64 percent but
rose in later rounds from 0:59 percent to 0:74 percent. The double di⁄erence of 0:55 is
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This ￿ attening of defaults is illustrated in Figure 1 for the
Roscas of a particular denomination (with 30 rounds and Rs. 500 monthly contribution).
As we noted in section 5, however, this double di⁄erence does not ensure identi￿cation of
adverse selection. For instance, the double di⁄erence in the winning bids is also positive and
signi￿cant indicating better loan terms for early recipients post-ceiling. Testing carefully
for adverse selection will involve conditioning on cosigner requirement, winning bid and
repayment burden, and allowing for aggregate shocks as in speci￿cation (22). Before doing
so we shall brie￿ y discuss how we will implement speci￿cation (22) empirically.
Early vs. Late Partitions
We showed that the speci￿cation (22) ensures identi￿cation of adverse selection. In this
section, we adapt speci￿cation (22) in two ways. First, we allow for 11 denominations in
our sample indexed by k. Second, we allow for di⁄erent partitions of early and late rounds
by indexing the late indicator by ￿,
ykti = ￿kt+￿k afteri+￿ afteri late￿
kt+￿kt ckti+￿j quarterjkti+ ktbkti+￿ktqkti+ukti: (23)
Notice that, except for the aggregate shock terms, we incorporate denomination-speci￿c and
round-speci￿c controls for collateral ckti, bid bkti and repayment burden qkti throughout.9
Our intention is to partition Roscas into early and late depending on how long the
ceiling binds. Here ￿ 2 (0;1) determines a ￿cuto⁄ round￿that separates early from late
8This is calculated by averaging default rates in columns 2￿3 and then 4￿5 in the ￿rst row of Table 2:
9In principle, could estimate (23) by OLS and/or by a Tobit speci￿cation (since the default rate is
censored at 0 and 1). For the present application the results from an OLS speci￿cation are of primary
interest since they are based on changes in the conditional expected value of actual defaults as opposed to
changes in the unobserved default propensity variable. More practically, given that (23) implies a total of
1;251 right hand side variables and that 121;943 observations are used, it was computationally infeasible to
maximize the associated likelihood function.
38borrowers, where, qualitatively, early borrowers correspond to the borrower of the ￿rst, and
late borrowers to the borrower of the second pot in our theoretical model. To be precise,
late￿
t equals one if t > n￿. For identi￿cation, ￿ has to be chosen such that ￿ attening of the
risk pro￿le occurs on or around round n￿. It is su¢ cient for identi￿cation that a lottery
occurs in round n￿ in at least some of the Roscas with restricted bidding. Here we discuss
alternative speci￿cations of this cuto⁄ ￿. The concern is ￿ attening may depend on the
extent to which the bid ceiling binds in each denomination. For the sake of robustness, we
use three alternative speci￿cations, which address the concern:
Rounds in Later Two Thirds We ￿rst specify the cuto⁄ ￿ = 1
3 for all denominations.
So late
1=3
kt is a dummy equal to one for all rounds in the later two thirds of a Rosca.
Formally, late
1=3
kt = 0 for t ￿ Tk=3 and late
1=3
kt = 1 for t > Tk=3.
Rounds in Second Half We next specify the cuto⁄ ￿ = 1
2 for all denominations. So
late
1=2
kt is a dummy equal to one for all rounds in the second half of a Rosca, i.e.
late
1=2
kt = 0 for t ￿ Tk=2 and late
1=2
kt = 1 for t > Tk=2.
Relative Round Finally, we take the statement "￿ attening of the default pro￿le" literally





Tk is the "relative round". In (23) the estimates ￿kt capture the trend of the
default pro￿le pre-ceiling and the estimated ￿kt+￿ afterki
t
Tk the trend of the default
pro￿le post ceiling. So a ￿ atter (and thus less downward sloping) default pro￿le post
ceiling results in a positive ￿. If ￿ = 0; then the trend post-ceiling coincides with
pre-ceiling.
Main Results
We turn to our main results. Recall that we are testing if the bid ceiling ￿ attens the
riskiness pro￿le. Given that we only observe defaults (and not riskiness directly), we
39estimate a conditional double di⁄erence of defaults (speci￿cation 23) and contrast it with
an unconditional double di⁄erence (benchmark speci￿cation 11).
The OLS results for the double di⁄erence in defaults (estimate of ￿) with and without
controls are in Table 3. The speci￿cation in column 1 refers to the benchmark without
controls with ￿ = 1
3:
ykti = ￿kt + ￿k afteri + ￿ afteri late
1=3
kt + ukti:
while column 2 includes all the controls as in
ykti = ￿kt +￿k afteri +￿ afteri late
1=3
kt +￿kt ckti + ktbkti +￿ktqkti +￿j quarterjkti +ukti:
Columns 3 and 4 correspond to the Rounds in Second Half speci￿cations (with ￿ = 1
2)
without and with controls: And columns 5 and 6 correspond to the Relative Rounds spec-
i￿cations, again ￿rst without and then with controls. We use two alternative measures for
the collateral requirement ￿the incidence of a cosigner (whether any cosigner was required
or not) and the number of cosigners (which ranges from 0 to 5): Each set of controls is
jointly signi￿cant, except for the number of cosigners (for which the F test fails to reject
in all speci￿cations). However, only the winning bid has a signi￿cant average e⁄ect. This
positive average e⁄ect implies that a higher winning bid results in signi￿cantly higher de-
faults. The zero average e⁄ect for cosigner incidence suggests that the lender manages to
fully compensate the e⁄ect of higher observed riskiness through the cosigner requirement
on average, else we would have found a positive average e⁄ect. The cosigner incidence,
repayment burden and aggregate shock controls have di⁄erent signs in di⁄erent rounds and
denominations (not shown in the table). So we reject on the F-test, but average e⁄ects are
not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Our main result is that the double di⁄erence b ￿ is positive and (mostly) signi￿cant
for all three speci￿cations of the adverse selection e⁄ect and is remarkably robust to the
introduction of controls for cosigners, winning bids, repayment burden and aggregate shocks.
As expected, for each of the three early-late partitions, the standard errors for the estimated
b ￿ substantially increase when the controls are added. The point estimates, however, remain
40unchanged in sign and similar in magnitude to those without the controls. This establishes
that riskier participants are willing to bid higher than safer participants are, despite the
cosigner requirement, as in part (i) of Proposition 1. The e⁄ect of such self selection on
unobserved riskiness is substantial: the point estimate of the ￿ attening e⁄ect b ￿ (in column
2 of Table 3) is about two-￿fth of the mean default rate (column 1; Table 2). This can be
interpreted as a one-￿fth fall in early defaults and a one-￿fth increase in late defaults.
Changes in Rosca Composition
One concern raised in section 5 is that the ￿ attening of the default pro￿le as measured by
￿ in speci￿cation (23) may be due to a change in the composition of Rosca participants
in response to the policy shock even when there is no selection on unobserved riskiness.
Recall, however, that no adverse selection together with a change in the average riskiness of
borrowers implies that all borrowers, both early and late, become either more or less risky
in response to the policy shock. As we have shown in section 5, this implies that ￿ and
(￿ + ￿) in
ykti = ￿kt+￿ afteri+￿ afteri late￿
kt+￿kt ckti+ ktbkti+￿ktqkti+￿j quarterjkti+ukti (24)
have the same sign. We thus conduct non-linear Wald tests of the hypothesis ￿(￿ + ￿) ￿ 0
for di⁄erent versions of equation (24). The alternative, ￿(￿+￿) < 0 is, of course, one-sided.
Notice that equations (24) and (23) are identical except for the parametrization of the after
dummy. While we allow for a denomination-speci￿c e⁄ect in (23), there is a uniform e⁄ect
in (24), which is needed to conduct the Wald test in a tractable way.
The results are in Table 4. For all three partitions, we ￿nd indeed that early defaults
decreased while late defaults increased, although not signi￿cantly so. Moreover, for the
Relative Round early/late partition, we reject the null hypothesis of (simultaneously) no
adverse selection and a change in average riskiness in response to the policy shock at the 90%
signi￿cance level. We fail to reject for the other two partitions at conventional signi￿cance
levels, however.
41Another informal way to jointly assess the three outcomes is to consider the sum of the
three Wald test statistics. If the three tests were from independent trials (which of course
they are not), the sum of ￿2:34 would correspond to a p￿value of 8:8 percent.
To summarize, there is suggestive evidence against a change in the composition of Rosca
participants and no adverse selection in all three speci￿cations considered here, with one
speci￿cation giving a rejection which is statistically signi￿cant. Given the conservative
nature of this test (see the discussion in Section 5), we believe that our results do re￿ ect
self-selection on unobserved riskiness and not changes in composition.
7 A Policy Reversal in 2002
In this section we conduct a robustness check. We test if a relaxing of the bid ceiling in
2002 led to the opposite e⁄ect on default pro￿les. In other words, we test if relaxing the
bid ceiling made it easier for riskier participants to take early pot. We do ￿nd evidence of
an "un-￿ attening" of the riskiness pro￿le. In this section we shall ￿rst describe the data
from the 2002 policy reversal. Then we shall discuss the results.
Data
The Rosca organizer lifted the bid ceiling on Roscas that started after January 1; 2002;
from 30 to 40 percent of the pot in response to an Amendment to the Chit Fund Act passed
by the Indian government. This was part of a general move towards ￿nancial liberalization
in India. We collected data from the Rosca organizer on November 30; 2005 nearly three
years after the 2002 policy shock. The organizer records arrears at the time Roscas are
completed as the fraction of payments still outstanding from a borrower. Over time these
arrears are adjusted downwards as legal action and other pressure from the organizer results
in the further collection of repayments. When these arrear rates stabilize several years after
the completion of the Rosca, we refer to them as defaults. Su¢ cient time has not elapsed
since the 2002 policy shock for us to use eventual default rates of Rosca borrowers. For
42this reason we will use arears while analyzing the lifting of the bid ceiling.10 Arrears are
of course highly correlated with eventual defaults.
We constructed the 2002 sample along the same lines as the sample of Roscas we used
for our analysis of the 1993 policy shock. So we included Roscas that were:
1. Started between January 1; 2001 and December 31; 2002
2. Completed and in the organizer￿ s database at the time of data collection
3. Of a denomination for which there were at least 35 Roscas started between January
1; 2001 and December 31; 2002.
This leaves us with 12 denominations for the 2002 sample (Table 5). The pot sizes
are (not surprisingly) considerably larger than with the 1993 sample. Just as before, we
eliminated institutional investors, leaving us with 60;312 observations. Table 5 shows that
there was an increase in Roscas of all denominations as a result of the 2002 policy shock.
As expected, the 30% bid ceiling binds for a large fraction of early rounds but the 40%
bid ceiling binds for a substantially smaller fraction of early rounds. For instance, for the
popular (40 round, Rs. 250) contribution, 54:7 percent of winning bids were at the Rs. 3000
ceiling (30% of the pot) before the policy reversal in the ￿rst half of Roscas. Only 21:8
percent were at the Rs. 4000 ceiling in early rounds after the policy reversal. A substantial
fraction of the winning bids (65:6 percent) were between Rs. 3000 and Rs. 4000 in the early
rounds after the policy reversal.
Table 6 shows that the arrear rates in the 2002 sample were 13:1 percent on average,
over ten times as high as the default rates in the 1993 sample (Table 2): The incidence
of the cosigner requirement and the number of cosigners required were also higher in 2002
compared with 1993: This presumably re￿ ects the increased pot sizes (and correspondingly
higher loans).
10It would be natural to think of the imposition of the bid ceiling in 1993 and the relaxation in 2002 as
one large natural experiment with three time periods. Since our dependent variable di⁄ers between the
initial policy shock and the reversal, however, we cannot do so.
43Results
The theory predicts that lifting the bid ceiling in 2002 will "steepen" the risk pro￿le. In
other words, variations in riskiness across Rosca participants will be re￿ ected in an increase
in the di⁄erence between arrear rates of early and late borrowers after the ceiling is lifted.
The double di⁄erence in arrears of ￿1:72 is negative and signi￿cant (Table 6). Arrear rates
were ￿ atter before the 2002 policy shock compared with after.
As we discussed in Section 5, unconditional di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences of arrear rates do
not by themselves indicate variations in inherent riskiness across borrowers. For instance,
loan terms also became less favorable for early borrowers relative to late as a result of the
bid ceiling (the average winning bids increased for early borrowers but dropped for late
borrowers in Table 6): That could indicate an increase in moral hazard propensity for early
borrowers relative to late as as a consequence of the policy reversal.
So in Table 7 we estimate adverse selection e⁄ects including controls for moral hazard-
mechanical e⁄ects and for aggregate shocks. Our identi￿cation strategy is the same as for
the 1993 policy shock. For speci￿cation (23), we would now expect negative estimates for
￿ indicating that riskiness pro￿le before the policy reversal was ￿ atter than after the policy
reversal. This is broadly what we ￿nd in Table 7 in contrast with Table 3 (where the
estimates of ￿ were positive from the imposition of the bid ceiling). We ￿nd a signi￿cant
negative estimate of ￿ for one of the three speci￿cations with controls (column 4; Table
7) and a barely insigni￿cant negative estimate of ￿ (column 6): The relaxation of the bid
ceiling was only partial (from 30% to 40% of the pot size) ￿and so the ceiling continued to
bind in the earliest rounds of post 2002 Roscas. It is no surprise then that the partition
"Rounds in Later Two Thirds" yields an insigni￿cant estimate of ￿ (in column 2). Since
the relaxation of the bid ceiling was most e⁄ective later in the ￿rst half (but not in the ￿rst
third) of Roscas, we would expect a smaller and less signi￿cant estimate of steepening in
the later two thirds (column 2) compared with the second half (column 4):
The economic magnitude on steepening of arrears in 2002 is smaller than the economic
magnitude of the ￿ attening was (in 1993): Relative to average arrears the estimated double
44di⁄erence in columns 4 and 6 of Table 7 are 8:2 and 6:2 percent only. while these ratios
were much higher in the 1993 default data. There are two possible reasons. First, the
2002 reversal was less dramatic than the imposition of the bid ceiling in 1993. Secondly,
the organizer￿ s collection of claims is a lengthy process continuing well past the time of
data collection. Some arrears then are probably delays arising from short-term shocks to
borrowers, rather than systematic di⁄erences in riskiness relevant for eventual defaults.
Finally we discuss the estimates on the controls in Table 6: In contrast with Table 3;
the number of cosigners is signi￿cantly positively associated with arrear rates (when the
number of cosigners exceeds 1): This implies than an increase in the number of cosigners
does not fully compensate for the additional arrear risk of observationally riskier borrowers.
As before the winning bid has a positive and signi￿cant average e⁄ect on arrear rates.
8 Conclusion
There is a long theoretical literature starting with Akerlof (1970) on adverse selection as
an impediment to e¢ cient trades. In this paper we have used a natural experiment to
investigate adverse selection in credit markets. This experiment involved imposing a bid
ceiling on bidding Roscas in 1993 which e⁄ectively made the early rounds more like random
Roscas. The experiment did not substantially change overall default rates. But the di⁄er-
ence between early and late defaulters changed substantially. We are thus able to identify
a signi￿cant and strong adverse selection e⁄ect. Further, we ￿nd the opposite e⁄ect when
the bid ceiling was partially lifted in 2002.
This paper highlights three methodological issues.
1. Loan o¢ cers often have private information on borrowers such as estimates of their
ex ante riskiness. The researcher does not have access to the lender￿ s soft information
about the borrowers. Such soft information can confound tests for information asym-
metries in credit markets. We propose a novel solution. The loan o¢ cer reveals his
private and soft information on ex ante riskiness of borrowers by his decision on how
45much collateral to ask them for. So controlling for collateral required can account
for information asymmetries between the researcher and the loan o¢ cer.
2. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) predict a positive correlation between willingness to pay and
unobserved riskiness in a credit market model of adverse selection . An analogous
positive correlation property has also been the basis of numerous tests of asymmetric
information in the insurance market (Chiappori et al, forthcoming). In this pa-
per we show theoretically that positive correlation between willingness to pay high
interest rates and riskiness in bidding Roscas can be eliminated or even reversed with
collateral. Then we ￿nd empirically that the positive correlation persists despite the
use of cosigners as collateral in the bidding Roscas we study.
3. Adverse selection is often di¢ cult to disentangle from moral hazard and other me-
chanical e⁄ects. This problem has been discussed in the context of insurance markets
(Chiappori and Salanie 2003) and credit markets (Karlan and Zinman, 2007): In this
paper we isolate adverse selection by controlling for loan terms before and after the
bid ceiling.
Finally, our research has speci￿c relevance for credit constraints and micro￿nance in
developing countries (Armendariz and Morduch, 2005): The organized Roscas we study
are similar to the Grameen Bank model of micro￿nance. Both are forms of ￿nancing that
use local information in the absence of traditional collateral. The organizer of Roscas
makes cosigners liable for repayments of borrowers while the Grameen Bank gives group
loans. We ￿nd that adverse selection persists despite cosigned loans; Ahlin and Townsend
(2007) ￿nd that adverse selection persists despite group loans.
9 Appendix
Derivation of the Willingness to Pay Functions g1(x;￿￿); g2(x;￿￿)
Of the two borrowers, the one who did not win the auction at date 1 will win the pot at
46date 2 at winning bid b2: In the second round, the expected utility of a borrower of type ￿











b1=3 is her share in the ￿rst period￿ s winning bid, x ￿ 2
3b2k is her payo⁄ from winning the
second auction while ￿￿￿ is the cost of furnishing a cosigner in period 2 who guarantees for
a liability of $1 one period later. Finally, in the third period, ￿ is that borrower￿ s expected
payo⁄ from defaulting and consuming her unit income. If that borrower loses the second






b2 + ￿2￿: (26)
De￿ne ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿￿: The willingness to pay for the second pot of a borrower of type ￿,





x ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ ￿￿)
i
: (27)
As the losing bidder in this auction has an incentive to drive up the winning bid as far as
possible, g(x￿
2;￿￿) will be the winning bid if the other bidder is the saver. Notice that this
willingness to pay is increasing in the di⁄erence ￿ ￿ ￿￿:
We denote by ￿ ￿the type complementary to type ￿, i.e. ￿ ￿= H if ￿ = L and ￿ ￿= L if
￿ = H. Working backwards, a borrower of type ￿ who observes a ￿rst-period shock of x
































In the ￿rst period, the borrower gains an instantaneous payo⁄ of x less the cost of external
￿nance 2
3b1k and the cost of collateral. As the expected liability of the winner of the ￿rst
pot is 1 ￿ 1
3EX(g2(X;￿￿ ￿) in the second and 1 in the third period, the cost of collateral
equals ￿￿ times the expression in brackets. In the second and third period, with probabil-
ity ￿; the winner of the ￿rst pot keeps her income; while with probability (1 ￿ ￿) she pays
47contributions in both subsequent periods and, at date 2, receives a one third share of the
winning bid.












De￿ne ￿￿ ￿ (￿￿;￿￿ ￿). Equating (28) and (29) gives the willingness to pay for the ￿rst




















Notice that assumption 1 implies that g1(x;￿￿) is positive for all x and ￿ because L ￿ H ￿
1, ￿￿ ￿ 0; and so ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 1 for all ￿.
Proof of Proposition 1
Using (30) and (27) to calculate E(g2(X;￿H)) and E(g2(X;￿L)), we have that
g1(x;￿H) ￿ g1(x;￿L) = (￿H ￿ ￿L)
3￿
(1 + 2k)2 [2(1 + ￿)k ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1)]:
The fraction 3￿=(1+2k)2 is clearly positive. To determine the sign of the term in brackets,
we use the upper bound on ￿ from (3). This yields
2(1 + ￿)k ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ 2(1 + ￿)k ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2k;
which is clearly greater than zero. Thus g1(x;￿H)￿g1(x;￿L) is proportional to (￿H￿￿L)
with a positive factor of proportionality. This immediately establishes all three parts of the
proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote by Prt(￿) the probability that the borrower of type ￿ wins the ￿rst auction in a
Rosca with no ceiling, and by Prc
t(￿) the corresponding probability in a Rosca with a bid
ceiling. We can write
E(￿1 ￿ ￿c
1) = (￿H ￿ ￿L)[Pr1(H) ￿ Prc
1(H)]: (31)
48De￿ne x = ￿ ￿ ￿=2, x = ￿ + ￿=2 and assume for the moment that ￿H ￿ ￿L. Together
with assumption 3 this implies that g1(x;￿L) ￿ g1(x;￿H) < b < g1(x;￿L) ￿ g1(x;￿H).


























The ￿rst line of the term on the right hand side captures the intersection of the domains
of the random variables g1(XL
1 ;￿L) and g1(XH
1 ;￿H). As, conditional on this event, each
individual is equally likely to have a higher willingness to pay, H wins in exactly half of
those cases. The second and third lines of the right hand side capture the event where L
has a willingness to pay smaller than the lower bound of g1(XH
1 ;￿H)￿ s distribution. In all
of those cases, H wins with probability one.






































Regarding the ￿rst line of the right hand side of this equation, notice that in comparison
to equation 32 the ceiling does not change the probability of one half, with which H wins
the ￿rst pot. Regarding the third line of the right hand side, when H￿ s willingness to pay
exceeds g1(x;￿L), she wins for sure only when L￿ s willingness to pay is smaller than b.


































= 0 and Pr1(H)￿Prc
1(H) = 0. Combining this
49with equation 31 and noticing that E(￿2 ￿ ￿c
2) = ￿E(￿1 ￿ ￿c
1) establishes parts (i) and (ii)
of the proposition.
By symmetry, if ￿L > ￿H, we obtain that Pr1(L)￿Prc
1(L) > 0, which implies Pr1(H)￿Prc
1(H) <
0. This establishes part (iii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3
For ￿ in estimating equation (20), we have that
lim
N!1

























































= E(After e ￿
u





1 ) ￿ E(After)[(1 ￿ E(After))E(￿u
1)] + E(After)E (￿
u;c
1 )
= E(After)[1 ￿ E(After)][E(￿
u;c












= cov(After;X1)(￿2 ￿ ￿1):






























= cov(After;X1)(￿2 ￿ ￿1):
Substituting identities (35) and (36) into (34) immediately establishes
lim
N!1
b ￿ = ￿u
1(￿2 ￿ ￿1): (37)
For ￿ + ￿ in estimating equation (20), we have that
lim
N!1
























and an analogous argument establishes that
lim
N!1
(b ￿ +b ￿) = ￿u
2(￿2 ￿ ￿1): (38)
Subtracting (37) from (38) immediately establishes part 1 of the proposition. Multiplication
of (37) and (38), and the fact that ￿u
1 and ￿u
2 are both positive by de￿nition establishes
part 2 of the proposition.and the prime superscript denotes the transpose operator.
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54Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for the 1993 Sample by Denomination 
 
      Number of Roscas       Winning Bid ≥ 30% of Pot (%)
  
     Before Shock    After Shock 
Duration  Contribution       Pot 
Before Shock After Shock     Increase (%) 
Early Late Early Late
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
20 500  10,000 32  84  162.5  3.5 0.0 19.5 0.3
25 400  10,000 92  79 -14.1  26.7 0.0 43.2 0.0
25 1,000  25,000 52  56  7.7  28.4 0.0 56.7 1.0
30 500  15,000 208  240  15.4  42.4 0.0 54.3 0.7
40 250  10,000 864  684 -20.8  79.1 2.2 72.0 3.7
40 500  20,000 52  32 -38.5  79.3 4.4 83.3 6.6
40 625  25,000 202  110 -45.5  70.9 0.6 76.1 5.1
40 1,250  50,000 12  23  91.7  80.6 0.0 84.8 11.9
40 2,500  100,000 24  20  -16.7  73.0 0.0 70.1 8.1
50 1000  50,000 170  86  -49.4  91.8 5.3 94.3 16.3
60 1,250  75,000 30  14  -53.3  98.7 12.9 100.0 31.4
Notes: 
Column 1: Roscas started between October 1992 and September 1993.  No bid ceiling. 
Column 2: Roscas started between October 1993 and September 1994.  Bid ceiling 30% of pot. 
Column 3: Percentage difference between values in columns 2 and 1. 
Columns 4 to 7: Percentage of auctions in which the winning bid is no less than 30% of the pot. 
Columns 4 and 6: First half of rounds in a Rosca. 
Columns 5 and 7: Second half of rounds in a Rosca. 
 Table 2. Default Rates, Cosigners, Winning Bids and Repayment Burdens, 1993 Sample 
Means 
 
  Before Shock       After Shock    Single Difference  Double Difference 
 
Entire 
Sample     Early     Late Early  Late    Early     Late   
         (1)         (2)  (3) (4)      (5)        (6)           (7)    (8) 
Default Rate (percent)  1.23 2.04  0.59  1.64  0.74   0.40  -0.15    0.55  
 (7.12) (9.46) (4.64) (8.13) (5.17)    [0.10] [0.09]    [0.08] 
Cosigner Incidence (percentage)  39.3 42.1 40.3 37.5 36.0   4.59 4.35  0.23 
 (48.8) (49.4) (49.1) (48.4) (48.0)    [0.67] [0.63]  [0.92] 
Number of Cosigners  0.71 0.75 0.74 0.67 0.66   0.08 0.08  0.00 
 (1.01) (1.01) (1.03) (0.97) (0.99)    [1.38] [1.30]    [1.90] 
Winning Bid (percentage of pot)  20.82 35.07  11.51 27.17  10.22   7.90  1.29    6.61  
 (13.48) (11.09) (6.76) (5.49) (6.06)    [1.11] [1.04]    [0.15] 
Repayment Burden (percentage of pot)  42.36 64.33  23.38  63.41  22.84   0.92  0.54    0.38  
 (23.50) (10.12) (12.98) (10.46) (12.73)    [0.16] [0.15]    [0.22] 
Observations 46,269 13,034 13,977 8,744 10,514      
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses for columns 1-5; Standard errors in brackets for columns 6-8. 
Column 6 reports the difference between the values in columns 2 and 4, column 7 the difference between columns 3 and 5. 
Column 8 reports the difference between the values in columns 6 and 7. Table 3. Selection on Unobserved Riskiness, 1993 Sample 
OLS 
Dependent Variable: Default Rate   
       (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
After*Rounds in Later Two Thirds   0.0067*** 0.0054**         
    (0.0015)  (0.0027)     
After*Rounds  in  Second  Half       0.0037*** 0.0039   
       (0.0013)  (0.0024)   
After*Relative  Round         0.0082*** 0.0113** 
         (0.0024)  (0.0052) 
Controls          
Cosigner  Incidence    No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
  F(388,  44293)   3.97***  3.97***  3.97***
  Average  Effect   -0.0002   -0.0002   -0.0003 
     (0.0032)   (0.0032)   (0.0032) 
Number  of  Cosigners    No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
  F(388,  44293)   1.04   1.04   1.04 
  Average  Effect   0.0004   0.0004   0.0004 
     (0.0016)   (0.0016)   (0.0016) 
Winning  Bid  (logarithmic)    No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
  F(388,  44293)   5.54***  5.54***  5.54***
  Average  Effect   0.0172***  0.0177***  0.0182***
     (0.0049)   (0.0048)   (0.0048) 
Repayment  Burden  (logarithmic)    No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
  F(388,  44293)   1.71***  1.71***  1.71***
  Average  Effect   0.0202   0.0202   0.0202 
     (0.1306)   (0.1306)   (0.1306) 
Aggregate  Shocks    No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
  F(24,  44293)   4.60***  4.60***  4.60***
          
R
2    0.0463 0.0917  0.046 0.0917 0.0461 0.0918 
Observations    46,269 46,269 46,269 46,269 46,269 46,269 Notes: 
* significant at 90%; ** significant at 95%; *** significant at 99%. 
Standard errors in parentheses in all specifications.  All specifications include 388 denomination-specific round dummies.  There are  2 k T −  
per denomination, where  k T  is the number of rounds of a Rosca of denomination k.  There are  2 k T −  instead of k T  interactions per 
denomination because there is no auction in the first and last round.  
The late variable is interacted with 11 denomination-specific dummies. 
24 quarterly dummies (first quarter 1993 to 4
th quarter 1998) are added in specifications with controls for aggregate shocks.  A dummy for the 
incidence of cosigners, which equals one if there is at least one cosigner attached to the loan and zero otherwise, interacted with denomination-
specific round dummies (a total of 388 interactions) are added in specifications with controls for cosigner incidence. The number of cosigners 
attached to the loan interacted with denomination-specific round dummies (a total of 388 interactions) are added in specifications with controls 
for the number of cosigners. The logarithm of the winning bid interacted with denomination-specific round dummies (a total of 388 
interactions) are added in specifications with controls for the winning bid. The logarithm of the amount owed interacted with denomination-
specific round dummies (388 interactions) are added in specifications with controls for repayment burden. The total number of regressors in 








   Table 4. Wald Test for Change in Average Riskiness of Rosca Members, 1993 Sample 
Specification of 
Late Rounds: 
Rounds in later 
two thirds  Rounds in Second Half  Relative Round 
   (1)         (2)            (3) 
ξ  -0.0046* -0.0027  -0.0061** 
 (0.0024)  (0.0019)  (0.0031) 
ξ + β 0.0007  0.0009  0.0040 
 (0.0016)  (0.0018)  (0.0028) 
W  -0.468 -0.57 -1.30* 
 [0.320]  [0.284]  [0.097] 
Notes: 
* significant at 90%; ** significant at 95%; *** significant at 99%.  
Each column presents part of the results from a single OLS regression of equation 25. Winning bid and 
repayment burden are in logarithms. There are 24 quarterly dummies (first quarter 1993 to 4
th quarter 1998) 
in each specification. Number of observations in each specification: 46,269.  
Standard errors in parentheses.  P-values in brackets. 
W is the test statistic for a non-linear Wald test of the null hypothesis ξ(ξ + β) ≥ 0. The distribution of the 
test statistic is asymptotically standard normal. As the alternative is one-sided, the associated p-value equals 
the value of the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable evaluated at W. Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the 2002 Sample by Denomination 
 
     Number of Roscas    Winning Bid ≥ 30% of Pot 
     Winning Bid
= 40% of Pot
     Before Shock After Shock        After Shock
Duration  Contribution       Pot 
Before Shock After Shock     Increase (%) 
Early Late Early Late Early Late
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) (9) 
25 400  10,000 299  306  2.34  44.0 0.0 30.9 0.1 5.7 0.0
25 1,000  25,000 204  187  -8.33  51.6 1.2 28.7 0.0 7.9 0.0
25 2,000  50,000 150  154  2.67  62.2 0.0 49.3 0.0 16.4 0.0
25 4,000  100,000 76  66  -13.16  69.0 0.5 53.0 0.0 16.2 0.0
30 500  15,000 286  244  -14.69  59.6 0.2 43.9 0.0 12.9 0.0
30 1,000  30,000 87  93  6.90  70.4 0.1 46.6 0.1 15.7 0.0
30 2,500  75,000 38  18  -52.63  73.9 0.8 64.1 0.0 23.9 0.0
30 10,000  300,000 28  26  -7.14 77.0 0.0 78.7 0.0 35.4 0.0
40 250  10,000 555  310  -44.14  54.7 0.5 65.6 0.4 21.8 0.0
40 625  25,000 155  112  -27.74  67.7 0.9 74.3 0.8 32.7 0.0
40 1,250  50,000 142  124  -12.68  78.0 2.2 86.9 1.8 44.7 0.1
40 2,500  100,000 130  138  6.15  86.8 4.9 89.7 2.4 57.6 0.0
Notes: 
Column 1: Roscas started between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2001.  Bid ceiling 30% of pot. 
Column 2: Roscas started between January 1, 2002 and December 31, 2002, and completed by December 2005.  Bid ceiling 40% of pot. 
Column 3: Percentage difference between values in columns 2 and 1. 
Columns 4 - 7: Percentage of auctions in which the winning bid is at least 30% of the pot. 
Columns 8 and 9: Percentage of auctions in which the winning bid equals 40% of the pot. 
Columns 4, 6 and 8: First half of rounds in a Rosca. Columns 5, 7 and 9: Second half of rounds in a Rosca. Table 6. Arrear Rates, Cosigners, Winning Bids and Repayment Burdens, 2002 Policy Shift 
Means 
 
  Before Shock          After Shock    Single Difference    Double Difference
 
Entire 
Sample     Early     Late Early Late    Early     Late     
       (1)              (2) (3) (4) (5)          (6)           (7)    (8) 
Arrear Rate (percent)  13.1  14.9 11.8 15.8 11.0   -0.92 0.79 -1.72 
 (20.8)  (20.1) (21.3) (20.9) (20.6)    [0.26] [0.23] [0.35] 
Cosigner Incidence (percentage)  52.8  77.4 33.5 77.5 34.9   0.07 1.34 1.27 
 (49.9)  (41.8) (47.2) (41.8) (47.6)    [0.56] [0.49] [0.75] 
Number of Cosigners  1.05  1.78 0.47 1.80 0.49   2.00 1.51 0.48 
 (1.19)  (1.22) (0.76) (1.24) (0.49)    [1.24] [1.08] [1.65] 
Winning Bid (percentage of pot)  17.4  27.2 9.3 30.0 8.8   -2.84 0.57 -3.34 
 (11.4)  (4.9) (5.8) (8.7) (5.3)    [0.07] [0.07] [0.10] 
Repayment Burden (percentage of pot)  40.7  65.8 21.5 65.9 21.7   -0.09 -0.26 0.17 
 (24.9)  (10.8) (12.8) (10.2) (12.8)    [0.15] [0.13] [0.20] 
Observations 60,312  15,313 19,732 10,767 14,500           
 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses for columns 1-5; Standard errors in brackets for columns 6-8. 
Column 6 reports the difference between the values in columns 2 and 4, column 7 the difference between columns 3 and 5. 
Column 8 reports the difference between the values in columns 6 and 7.  
Table 7. Selection on Unobserved Riskiness, 2002 Policy Shift 
OLS 
Dependent Variable: Arrear Rate   
       (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
After*Rounds in Later Two Thirds   -0.0103*** -0.0024         
   (0.0037)  (0.0059)         
After*Rounds in Second Half        -0.0170*** -0.0108**     
       (0.0034)  (0.0053)     
After*Relative Round          -0.0272*** -0.0162 
         (0.0059)  (0.0106) 
Controls            
Cosigner Incidence    No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 F(388,  58510)  2.14***   2.14***   2.14***
 Average  Effect  -0.0172***   -0.0171***   -0.0171***
  (0.0039)    (0.0039)    (0.0039) 
Number of Cosigners    No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 F(388,  58510)  1.20    1.20***   1.20***
 Average  Effect  0.0159***   0.0159***   0.0159***
  (0.0016)    (0.0016)    (0.0016) 
Winning Bid (logarithmic)    No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 F(388,  58510)  2.66***   2.66***   2.66***
 Average  Effect  0.0601***   0.0594***   0.0594***
  (0.0050)    (0.0049)    (0.0049) 
Repayment Burden (logarithmic)    No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 F(388,  58510)  0.92    0.92    0.92 
 Average  Effect  0.0260    0.0237    0.0243 
  (0.0602)    (0.0602)    (0.0602) 
Aggregate Shocks    No Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 F(24,44265)    3.40***   3.40***   3.40***
                  
R
2   0.0739   0.1113   0.0741  0.1113  0.0740 0.1113 
Observations   60,312  60,312  60,312  60,312  60,312  60,312 Notes: 
* significant at 90%; ** significant at 95%; *** significant at 99%. 
Standard errors in parentheses in all specifications.  All specifications include 354 denomination-specific round dummies.  There are  2 k T −  
per denomination, where  k T  is the number of rounds of a Rosca of denomination k.  There are  2 k T −  instead of k T  interactions per 
denomination because there is no auction in the first and last round.  
The late variable is interacted with 12 denomination-specific dummies. 
19 quarterly dummies (second quarter 2001 to 4
th quarter 2005) are added in specifications with controls for aggregate shocks.  A dummy for 
the incidence of cosigners, which equals one if there is at least one cosigner attached to the loan and zero otherwise, interacted with 
denomination-specific round dummies (a total of 354 interactions) are added in specifications with controls for cosigner incidence. The 
number of cosigners attached to the loan interacted with denomination-specific round dummies (a total of 354 interactions) are added in 
specifications with controls for the number of cosigners. The logarithm of the winning bid interacted with denomination-specific round 
dummies (a total of 354 interactions) are added in specifications with controls for the winning bid. The logarithm of the amount owed 
interacted with denomination-specific round dummies (354 interactions) are added in specifications with controls for repayment burden. The 
total number of regressors in columns 2, 4 and 6 thus is 1,802. Figure 1. Empirical Average Default Profiles with Unrestricted (dotted line) and 
Restricted Bidding (solid line) in Roscas of the <30 round, Rs 500 contribution> 
denomination. 
 Figure 2. Willingness to Pay for the First Pot (Adverse Selection). 
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x  Figure 3. Probability of Winning the First Auction with Adverse Selection 
Panel A. Unrestricted Bidding. 
Panel B. Restricted Bidding. 
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L gx ∆  Figure 4. Willingness to Pay for the First Pot (No Adverse Selection). 
High Risk Type (dashed line) Low Risk Type (solid line). Bid Ceiling (dotted line). 
 
 
Figure 5. Probability of Winning the First Auction, No Adverse Selection. 
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Figure 6. Riskiness Profiles with Adverse Selection. 
Rosca with Unrestricted Bidding (dashed line) and Restricted Bidding (solid line). 
 
Figure 7. Riskiness Profiles with No Adverse Selection. 
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1  Figure 8. Default Profiles, Rosca with Unrestricted Bidding (dashed line) and Restricted 
Bidding (solid line). 
Panel A. Adverse Selection, no Change in Rosca Composition. 
Panel B. No Adverse Selection, Change in Rosca Composition. 
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